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Rethinking Risks to Subjects in Genetic Research
Although the concern of biomedical researchers for the
well-being of human subjects is as old as research itself,
the modern era has a well-defined beginning. The hor-
rors conducted by the Nazi doctors under the name of
research led directly to the drafting in 1946 of the Nu-
remberg Code (1949; Annas and Grodin 1992). Only
500 words long, the document holds a hallowed place
in western culture. Not unlike the Emancipation Proc-
lamation that ended slavery in the United States, the
Nuremberg Code firmly rejects for all time the notion
that humans may be treated as objects in clinical re-
search. The fundamental principle of the code is in its
first line: “The voluntary consent of the human subject
is absolutely essential” (p. 181).
The 1950s and 1960s largely predate the emergence
of bioethics as a formal discipline. In some quarters,
however, efforts were made to disseminate the principles
embodied in the Nuremberg Code and to emphasize to
investigators that they had an ethical obligation to pro-
tect human subjects. For example, the 1961 handbook
of the NIH Clinical Center describes hazard to the sub-
ject as always a “primary concern” (NIH 1961). In those
years, however, the doctrine of informed consent, now
a cornerstone of research, was not yet fully developed,
and virtually no thought was given to the ethical issues
that arise in research involving vulnerable populations.
A seminal event in the history of research ethics occurred
when Dr. Henry Beecher, a professor at HarvardMedical
School, published an influential article criticizing the
treatment, by clinical investigators, of human subjects,
as described by the researchers themselves in dozens of
scientific papers published after World War II (Beecher
1966). One of the most troubling examples concerned
efforts to develop a vaccine for hepatitis, that included
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deliberately infecting retarded children at Willowbrook,
a state-run institution located on Staten Island, New
York. This occurred with parental consent, but the con-
sent process was clouded because parents who agreed
were able to move their (often severely retarded) children
to the top of the list of persons waiting for admission.
Soon after Beecher’s paper was published, the 37-year
history (1932–69) of the Tuskegee syphilis study gar-
nered national attention. Here, the central ethical con-
cern was that many persons with active syphilis were
not offered penicillin therapy when it became available
because to do so would undercut a key research goal:
careful documentation of the natural course of the dis-
ease (Jones 1981).
In the 1970s, the research community and the federal
government began to formalize rules for the ethical con-
duct of clinical research trials. In 1974, the federal gov-
ernment issued its first regulations concerning the pro-
tection of human subjects (Federal Register 1974). That
same year, enactment of the National Research Act cre-
ated the National Commission for the Protection of Hu-
man Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research
and charged it to identify the “basic ethical principles”
that should underlie research involving humans (Public
Law 1974). On August 8, 1975, regulations were im-
plemented that paid special concern both to research
involving particularly vulnerable populations (fetuses
and pregnant women) and to in vitro fertilization (Code
of Federal Regulations 1975a). The commission worked
for 4 years, an effort that culminated in the Belmont
Report (1979), a succinct document that has stood the
test of time and, like the Nuremberg Code, should be
in the office of every scientist who conducts research
with human subjects.
The 1975 regulations created the system of institu-
tional review boards (IRBs) that are now such a familiar
feature of the research process in the United States. Per-
haps not fully appreciated is the dramatic change ef-
fected when the federal regulations made institutions
share responsibility with investigators for the ethical
conduct of human-subjects research. In reviewing re-
search proposals, each IRB was charged to determine
that (1) the risks to the subjects were outweighed by the
potential benefits of the research, (2) the rights of the
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subjects would be adequately protected, and (3) “legally
effective informed consent will be obtained by adequate
and appropriate methods” (Code of Federal Regulations
1975b).
During the period 1975–90, the process of providing
ethical review of proposals to conduct research involving
human subjects matured. The major areas of IRB con-
cern were the assessment of physical risk, the protection
of vulnerable populations (including children and adults
with limited mental capacity), and the quality of the
consent process. Beginning in the early 1990s, there
emerged an important new theme in the ethics of bio-
medical research: that gene-discovery studies posed the
threat of genetic discrimination—that there is a risk of
informational harm associated with participating in
studies that elicit genetic information from which one
might infer health status.
The growth and magnitude of concern over genetic
discrimination during the 1990s has been significant.
Despite the fact that the corpus of published literature
that purports to document such discrimination (usually
in the form of denials of access to health insurance, life
insurance, or employment) against otherwise healthy
persons on the basis of genotype is small (Billings et al.
1992; Geller et al. 1996), a large fraction of the Amer-
ican public and their legislators currently perceive such
economic discrimination to be a genuine risk. To give
one measure of the current level of interest in averting
the threat of genetic discrimination, consider that, from
1975 through 1990, only one federal bill intended to
regulate the use of genetic information was introduced
in Congress, whereas, since 1995, 120 such bills have
been filed.
In the mid-1990s, those who had focused largely on
the potential abuse of clinically derived genetic infor-
mation enlarged the scope of their warnings to include
research studies. To my knowledge, no reports of infor-
mational harm due to deliberate or inadvertent violation
of research databases stimulated this change. At least
two developments did influence the new concern. The
first was the realization that there were many inchoate
DNA databases—large collections of tissue samples that
had been collected in earlier years, pursuant to multi-
center trials for which permission to conduct genetic
tests had not originally been sought—that might have
greater value if genotyping could be combined with ex-
isting demographic and clinical data. The second was
the increasing amount of research by gene mappers who
studied small, highly self-defined populations because
they appeared to have a high prevalence of a particular
phenotype—thus suggesting the presence of an influ-
ential predisposing allele (McKeigue 1997). The first led
to a sustained but now resolving debate about the proper
use of archived material (Clayton et al. 1995). The sec-
ond has raised a new bioethical concern: that the model
of informed consent that is bedrock to the conduct of
research involving human subjects may not be adequate
when a highly defined branch of the human family is
the focus of the genomic research.
This later concern also arose in part because the rep-
resentatives of and advocates for indigenous peoples
around the world began to express suspicion that the
scientific community in the wealthy nations intended to
acquire and use genetic facts about them to createwealth
in which they, the indigenous peoples, would not share
(Taube 1995; Friedlander 1996). In effect, the argument
was that researchers were behaving in a manner that
recalled the 19th century colonialism of European pow-
ers seeking new markets. This concern has been heard
by the community of nations. Recently, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (1997) adopted a “Declaration on the Human Ge-
nome” that strongly supports the principle that indig-
enous populations are not merely a resource to be
genetically mined by rich scientific teams from western
nations. The ideas embodied in Articles IV and V of the
UNESCO Declaration recognize a community interest
in genetic research that operates on a different plane and
has different implications than does the process of en-
rolling a subject.
Foster, Bernstein, and Carter (1998 [in this issue]) sug-
gest that, in conducting genetic research with some eth-
nic groups, researchers must, before attempting to satisfy
the standard imposed by the principle of informed con-
sent, first meet a new ethical obligation. They argue that,
in certain populations, community discourse is an im-
portant antecedent to the standard consent process that
defines the relationship between the investigator and the
individual subject. Their paper recounts the process by
which they sought understanding and community con-
sensus for a genetic study involving an Apache tribe in
Oklahoma. They point out that the individuals they
sought to enroll as subjects are part of a small group
that has been and still is the object of discrimination by
members of larger groups in our culture. They posit that,
because evidence that Apaches are genetically predis-
posed to a particular disease could reinforce discrimi-
natory behavior, research conducted on some members
of the tribe could lead to knowledge that, once dissem-
inated, might harm any member of the tribe, whether
or not the individual had participated in the research.
Foster et al. (1998) describe how they successfully ad-
dressed this issue among the Apache, and they propose
a model that they think is generalizable for other re-
searchers working with members of other cultures. The
essence of the model is that research should be preceded
by careful efforts to understand how decisions are made
in the particular culture. Success in understanding the
relevant decision-making units in the society should per-
mit the investigators to identify appropriate represen-
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tatives who can foster discourse with the community. If
community consensus favoring the research is reached,
evidence thereof should be submitted to the IRB. Once
the IRB has determined that consensus has been reached
(and if the proposed study survives other analysis), the
IRB can permit the standard efforts to recruit subjects.
I have little criticism of the approach advocated by
Foster et al. (1998), so long as I accept their premise. I
do, however, have some doubts about the premise. They
state that “[t]he primary risk [arising from research in
a socially identifiable population] is that laypersons may
misuse scientific findings” (p. 000). In effect, they argue
that publication of a paper announcing the discovery of
an allele that predisposes to adult-onset diabetes in the
Apache tribe could become grapeshot for the guns of
prejudice. I agree that, among those who harbor strong
prejudice against Native Americans, some might use a
genetic predisposition to diabetes to rationalize their
own feelings and to propagate prejudice among others.
I doubt, however, that this would lead to a discernible
increase in intolerance. On the other hand, there may
be some kinds of genetic predisposition (say, to addictive
behavior) that, if demonstrated to be disproportionately
common among a particular ethnic group, could fan the
fires of hatred in a significant way. Foster et al. (1998)
seem to back off from this concern when they assert that
the larger risk is discrimination within the Apache by
one individual against another.
Even if we accept the premise that there are ethnic
groups in which all members could be threatened by
misunderstanding or deliberate misuse of new genetic
information and that such groups should be afforded
the opportunity to have a dialogue with investigators,
the solution suggested by the authors still raises signif-
icant operational issues. Their model of community par-
ticipation and approval seems workable only with small
groups that have a well-defined leadership structure. The
challenge of seeking community approval within a tribe
of a few hundred is imaginable; the challenge of seeking
consensus among larger groups is not.
Over the last few years, driven in part by reports in-
dicating that as many as 2.5% of Ashkenazi Jews carry
a germ-line mutation that predisposes to ovarian and/
or breast cancer (Struewing et al. 1997), some members
of that community have become deeply concerned about
genetic discrimination. Given the horrors perpetrated
against Jews over the centuries, especially theHolocaust,
the concern must be respected. Yet, it is worth noting
that much of the research concerning genetically influ-
enced diseases among Ashkenazi Jews is both conducted
by Jewish scientists and supported by Jewish organiza-
tions (Waldman 1998). The capacity for hatred is part
of human behavior. No matter what new knowledge is
discovered, there will be someone ready to twist it to
serve a terribly wrong goal.
The approach used by Foster and his colleagues raises
several issues. First, their decision to conduct ethno-
graphic interviews with 150 members of the Apache
tribe as a preliminary step in developing community con-
sensus around the research could, if generalized, create
a significant new cost to gene-mapping studies. Second,
the creation of a community-based (tribal) IRB that, in
addition to its other activities, assumed the task of ne-
gotiating a subcontract with the University of Oklahoma
(the institutional home of the investigators) to determine
the allocation of the rights to the potential wealth from
intellectual property created by the research could be
viewed as creating a possible conflict of interest. Third,
the suggestion that comparative DNA studies could dis-
cover information about Native American migration
patterns that is in conflict with Apache origin narratives
raises an unusual problem in informed consent. Should
a potential subject be warned that one or more findings
may challenge his religious beliefs? This strikes me as
beyond the appropriate boundaries of the duty to warn,
for it suggests that scientists must censor their inquiries
if conducted in the shadow of religion. When Galileo
trained his telescope on the heavens and saw four moons
orbiting Jupiter, he set in motion forces that would de-
stroy the narratives built around a geocentric uni-
verse—no doubt upsetting the world views of a lot
people.
Foster et al. (1998) suggest that the Apache tribe is
similar to other vulnerable populations (children, preg-
nant women, and prisoners) that have been singled out
for special protection by the federal regulations that gov-
ern research with human subjects. This argument opens
the door to a line of reasoning that makes me uneasy.
Adult members of the Apache tribe are autonomous per-
sons who (with rare exceptions, such as those with men-
tal retardation) have the capacity to decide whether or
not to participate in a study. To suggest otherwise invites
the paternalistic suggestion that the tribe needs a special
layer of protection, an idea that is inherently demeaning.
The authors assert that the approach they developed
to conduct genetic research among the Apache is ge-
neralizable. In their words, “Everyone is a member of
one or more socially identifiable populations” (p. 000).
It seems to me that few of us belong to just one such
clearly defined population. Could not most of us claim
membership in two or more ethnic groups (Irish, Italian,
Jew)? And who among us can identify an obvious public
or private entity within those groups that is socially em-
powered to speak for the rest? The recent concern raised
among Ashkenazi Jews about the dangers of genetic re-
search elicited sharply differing responses among differ-
ent groups that purport to speak for portions of that
community in the United States (Wadman 1998).
I think the notion that clinical research among socially
identifiable populations should proceed only if the in-
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vestigators have educated the community and achieved
consensus should be viewed as a laudable goal, but not
as an ethical or legal obligation. The successful work
with the Apache will not be so easy to replicate in other
cultures. Efforts to proceed in a similar fashion elsewhere
could lead to great expense and long delays and could,
possibly, chill some research. They could also lead to a
new kind of forum shopping, as investigators try to de-
termine which population would be easiest toworkwith.
The real issue at hand is how to ensure that, when per-
sons who are members of socially identifiable popula-
tions decide whether or not to participate in research,
they do not have to weigh the risks of genetic discrim-
ination for themselves or their community.
There are no easy cures for prejudice, but a deeper
understanding of genetics may be more likely to combat
prejudice than to support it. Thanks to advances in mo-
lecular genetics, we have learned that each of us shares
∼99.9% of our nucleotide sequence with even our most
geographically dispersed neighbors and genetically dis-
tant cousins. This information would gratify the great
geneticist, Theodosius Dobzhansky. Twenty-five years
ago, he argued that the 2,000-year effort to enforce a
caste system on the Indian subcontinent was a complete
failure because the genetic diversity retained among dif-
ferent social groups made it impossible to create mean-
ingful genetic differences between them (Dobzhansky
1973).
The major value of the contribution by Foster and his
colleagues (1998) may not be in the dissemination of a
model agreement for obtaining community consensus
for genetic research, although that is certainly helpful.
Their paper reminds us that we are dealing with ex-
traordinarily powerful information in the use of which
we must take the utmost care. Geneticists must be aware
that information they discover can lead to harm in ways
that are difficult to anticipate. Among the most perni-
cious risks is that genetic information could be twisted
to rationalize ethnic or racial prejudices that already so
deeply threaten the human family.
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